Macao as a Strategic Pivot: A Shock Absorber for the Nation's Opening-Up
Late at night, Mr. Lo, head of a smart-lighting company, was still working with his team across time zones, finalizing contract details line by line with a Brazilian client. The product had secured a tentative order—but how to sign a Portuguese-language contract, how to settle payment, how to certify standards, where to arbitrate disputes: four hurdles, each marked with the word “uncertainty.” This is not the story of one company; it is the shared experience of countless Chinese enterprises going global.

On August 18, the Third Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Macao Special Administrative Region (2026–2030) was officially released. This programmatic document—ten parts and thirty-six chapters, proactively aligned with the nation's 15th Five-Year Plan—answers precisely that business owner's late-night question, which is also a question of our times: how can a small city find a big place in a national strategy? In my view, the answer lies not in size but in positioning. The position Macao should occupy is that of a strategic pivot in the nation's opening-up; and the way this pivot works is by serving as a “shock absorber” for enterprises going global—turning a daring leap into a well-prepared soft landing.
Two views about Macao once circulated. One held that Macao is merely a leisure and tourism city, hardly fit to serve the nation's opening-up; the other held that to become a platform, Macao must copy the paths of Hong Kong or Singapore. A few facts suffice to show that both are only half right. The nation's designation of Macao as a “World Centre of Tourism and Leisure” and a “Commercial and Trade Cooperation Service Platform between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries” inherently carries the mission of serving the nation's opening-up. As a free port and separate customs territory with over four centuries of East–West exchange, Macao has built up an institutional interface with the Portuguese-speaking countries that is hard to replace. Rarer still is the social consensus: during forty days of public consultation on the plan, 1,716 submissions totalling 8,230 comments were received, 92 percent of them positive. A path that commands such popular support was not devised in an office—it grew out of Macao's own soil.
The value of this “shock absorber” lies in turning a “leap” into a “landing,” and it functions on three levels. First, it absorbs uncertainty through professional services: legal, accounting, financial and arbitration support, so that enterprises need not navigate an unfamiliar rules environment alone. Second, it keeps risk resolution within the system: for companies that have gone global and suffered a hard landing, tailored “one enterprise, one policy” support and expert accompaniment help them turn crisis into opportunity—the absorber cushions, but it also rebounds. Third, it converts the compliance thresholds of the digital era into service capability: making good use of technology and artificial-intelligence tools to help enterprises build lawful, compliant overseas digital assets, reducing institutional turbulence in the digital realm. What Chinese enterprises going global—especially micro, small and medium-sized ones—have never lacked is courage; what they lack is cushioning.
Equally notable is the differentiated path. Macao focuses on MSMEs and asset-light sectors, lowering entry barriers to a minimum through precisely matched platforms, dedicated support programmes and a “big leading small” ecosystem of collaboration, so that inclusive benefits reach the broadest business community. At the same time, drawing on the combined advantages of the Guangdong-Macao In-Depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin, Macao prudently explores compliant offshore digital-asset businesses—putting in place the twin engines of technology and finance even before the science and technology R&D industrial park is completed. This is not a contest with Hong Kong or Singapore for territory, but the missing piece in the nation's map of opening-up: bringing what Macao does best to serve what the nation needs. Of course, for a pivot to truly move the whole of the nation's opening-up, institutional advantages must be translated into services enterprises can feel, and a differentiated position must be consolidated into an irreplaceable one—between these two “musts” lies the entire workload of turning the Third Five-Year Plan from blueprint into reality.
The blueprint is drawn; delivery is the key. A “shock absorber” does not grow by itself. Across the three stages—before, during and after—government, industry and academia each have homework to do.

Before departure: cushion, absorbing uncertainty in advance. The government should promptly set up a dedicated task force and a one-stop window for enterprises going global, integrating Portuguese-language legal, accounting, certification and arbitration services into a standardized “going-global service package,” so that MSMEs can see the reefs along the route before they set sail. This translates Macao's institutional endowment into tangible services for the nation's high-standard opening-up.
During the journey: carry through, turning individual experience into public assets. Industry should jointly build a pool of certified service providers and a case knowledge base, so that under a “big leading small” ecosystem the experience of pioneers becomes the roadbed for followers—a pit one company has fallen into should not trap a second. This converts the trial-and-error costs of individual firms into the overall resilience of the nation's opening-up system.
After the event: rebound, honing crisis management into a discipline. For companies that have suffered a hard landing, apply “one enterprise, one policy” with expert accompaniment; academia should treat these cases as serious scholarship—writing more useful reports, training more capable students, and walking more companies through the hardest stretch of the road. Coordinating development and security must be reflected not only in the nation's top-level design, but also in every single spring of Macao's “shock absorber.”
A pivot is not proclaimed; it is fastened screw by screw. And the hands tightening those screws are among this generation of Macao's young people.
The executive-led system gives Macao the efficiency to concentrate resources on major undertakings; “One Country, Two Systems” gives Macao the endowment to connect China and the West. President Xi Jinping urged Macao to “stand tall and look far, embrace all rivers, and forge ahead with resolve.” Carried into the Third Five-Year Plan, this charge binds Macao's destiny tightly to the nation's opening-up, so that the institutional strengths of “One Country, Two Systems” can advance steadily and go far in serving the nation's needs. This is the most concrete practice of the core value of “loving the country and loving Macao” in the new era. The weight of the plan lies not in the lines of its ten parts and thirty-six chapters, but in the ledgers of thousands upon thousands of enterprises. The opportunity history has given Macao must ultimately come down to whether that business owner in the late-night office can get a good night's sleep.
Macao need not become the next Hong Kong or Singapore. May it be that, five years from now, every business owner negotiating across time zones late into the night has a Macao-made “shock absorber” beneath their feet. This is Macao's simplest and sturdiest answer to the “mutual reinforcement of domestic and international circulation.”
